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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CLEO N. SMITH, 
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ESTHER MORRIS, 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GEORGE B. HANDY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
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Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent . 
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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CLEO N. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ESTHER MORRIS, 
Defendant. 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GEORGE B. HANDY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8947 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent is in substantial agreement with the ap-
pellant's Statement of Facts, but would clarify and empha-
size certain aspects of the case. George B. Handy was 
counsel for plaintiff, Cleo N. Smith, in the case of Cleo N. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
Smith v. Esther Morris, No. 114357, in the District Cour 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. A pre-trial hearin: 
of the case was held March 20, 1958 and pursuant to th 
pre-trial order of the Court, dated March 24, 1958, counse 
was informed that the case had been set for jury trial OJ 
April 29, 1958 at 10 o'clock a. m. (R. 5). A jury of sixteeJ 
qualified jurors was drawn on April 25, 1958 (R. 6). 
On the 29th day of April, 1958, and at the time set fo: 
trial, Attorney George B. Handy (1) did not appear; (2: 
did not communicate to the Court his intention to absen 
himself; (3) has never given the Court an explanation o 
his absence (R. 6). 
The Court, on its own motion, ordered Attorney Hand; 
as a result of his conduct to pay within 10 days the sun 
of $128.00, an amount equal to the costs incurred in pro 
curing a jury. Although Attorney Handy was informed. o: 
the Court's order on April 29, 1958, he chose to ignore it 
On July 22, 1958, the Court entered a judgment in the sun 
of $128.00 against defendant Handy and in favor of th1 
District Court of Salt Lake County (R. 6). From this judg 
ment appellant has appealed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING 
ATTORNEY HANDY TO PAY $128.00 FOR 
HIS MISCONDUCT. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ORDERING 
ATTORNEY HANDY TO PAY $128.00 FOR 
HIS MISCONDUCT. 
Contrary to the contention of appellant, we are of the 
conviction that the issue in this case is not whether an 
attorney is liable for the costs of impanelling a jury, but 
whether an attorney may be summarily punished for his 
failure to attend court. 
An attorney may be guilty of contempt for wilfully 
neglecting his duty to attend the trial of a case when it is 
called. 12 Am. Jur., Contempt, Sec. 11, page 396. Accord-
ing to Section 78-32-1, U. C. A. 1953: 
"The following acts or omissions in respect to 
a court or proceedings therein are contempts of the 
authority of the court: 
"* * * 
"(3) Misbehavior in office, or other wilful 
neglect or violation of duty by an attorney, counsel, 
clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected 
to perform a judicial or ministerial service. 
"* * * 
"(9) Any other unlawful interference with 
the process or proceedings of a court. 
"* * *" 
Generally the question is not whether an attorney's 
failure to attend court is contempt, but whether such con-
duct is a direct or indirect contempt. See Annotation, At-
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torneys' :failure to attend court or tardiness as contempt, 
59 A. L. R. 1272. 
Section 78-32-3, U. C. A. 1953, provides: 
"When a contempt is committed in the immed-
iate view and presence of the court, or judge at 
chambers, it may be punished summarily, for which 
an order must be made, reciting the facts as occur-
ring in such immediate view and presence, adjudg-
ing that the person proceeded against is thereby 
guilty of a contempt, and that he be punished as 
prescribed in section 78-32-10 hereof. When the 
contempt is not committed in the immediate view 
and presence of the court or judge at chambers, an 
affidavit shall be presented to the court or judge 
of the facts constituting the contempt, or a state-
ment of the facts by the referees or arbitrators or 
other judicial officers." (Emphasis added.) 
Section 78-32-10, U. C. A. 1953, provides: 
"Upon the answer and evidence taken the court 
or judge must determine whether the person pro-
ceeded against is guilty of the contempt charged, and 
if it is adjudged that he is guilty of the contempt, 
a fine may be imposed upon him not exceeding $200, 
or he may be imprisoned in the county jail not ex-
ceeding thirty days, or he may be both fined and 
imprisoned; provided, however, that a justice of the 
peace may punish for contempt by a fine not to 
exceed $100 or by imprisonment for one day, or by 
both such fine and imprisonment." 
In applying the foregoing statutes to the case at hand, two 
questions are raised: (1) May an attorney be summarily 
punished for failure to attend court? (2) Was the lower 
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court's action in this case in the nature of a contempt pro-
ceeding? 
According to the case of Lyons v. Superior Court, 
(Calif.), 278 P. 2d 681, an attorney by absenting himself 
from the court, and thus obstructing a trial, is within the 
view and presence and knowledge of the court as would be 
any other conduct by him during the trial. The California 
court states as follows : 
"* * * 
"We are likewise satisfied that petitioner's con-
duct constituted 'a contempt * * * committed 
in the immediate view and presence of the court'-
i. e., a direct contempt-which the court is empow-
ered to punish summarily under the provisions of 
section 1211 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is 
clear that the trial and the attorneys' participation 
in it are in the court's immediate view and presence 
and, obviously, petitioner's obstruction of the trial 
by absenting himself from the court is just as di-
rectly within the view and presence and knowledge 
of the court as would be any other conduct by him 
during, and directly affecting, the trial. If in truth, 
the absence with its ensuing interruption of the 
court proceedings is occasioned by some cause not 
reasonably within the attorney's control, the duty 
of explanation is but part and parcel of his duty to 
be present, and the burden of producing the exculpa-
tory facts to the court properly falls upon the at-
torney. The latter, not the judge, is the officer of 
the court who under those circumstances owes a 
duty of proceeding. The effect of a contrary holding 
would be to absolve the defaulting attorney from 
any burden of explanation of his absence, no matter 
how flagrant and often repeated, unless the judge 
takes the burden of filing a charge and instituting 
formal proceedings. This would make of the judge 
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not a judicial officer carrying out the responsibili 
ties of his office, but a complaining witness in aJ 
adversary proceeding. Such a rule, we think, woul1 
not only be contrary to long established law bu 
would not best serve the administration of justice.: 
See also Shotkin v. A. T. & S. F., (Colo.), 235 P. 2d 990. 
Respondent admits the existence of authority to th1 
contrary wherein it has been held that an attorney's failur1 
to attend court is an indirect contempt, requiring the filin! 
of an affidavit and subsequent hearing. To this effect, w1 
invite the Court's attention to the annotation, Attorney'1 
failure to attend court or tardiness as contempt, 59 A 
L. R. 1272, and to the cases of Klein v. United States, 15J 
F. 2d 286, and Lee v. Bauer, (Fla.), 72 So. 2d 792. Wher 
an attorney fails to attend court and therefore is not physi· 
cally present in the court, the foregoing cases consider an3 
resulting contempt could not be "committed in the presencE 
of the court." However, it is the attorney's "absence" tha1 
is offensive to the court and interrupts the trial procedure. 
and that "absence" does occur in the view and presence oj 
the court. 
We submit that the reasoning in the Lyons decision 
supra, is persuasive and recognizes that the failure of ar 
attorney to attend court may be contempt and the burder 
of explaining the absence should properly rest with thE 
attorney himself, and not upon the court in instituting ar 
adversary proceeding. The cases which would hold ar 
attorney guilty of an indirect contempt through his failurE 
to attend court place great weight upon the possibility tha1 
such failure may arise out of excusable circumstances. WE 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
would readily admit that in many cases of failure to attend 
court, an attorney would have a reasonable excuse for his 
conduct. However, this would not necessarily compel the 
conclusion that the attorney should not be summarily pun-
ished, and require the filing of the necessary affidavit and 
citation of the offender into court on an order to show cause. 
We submit that under Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, one summarily adjudged guilty of contempt 
for failure to appear might, upon his own motion, set forth 
a reason justifying relief from the operation of the judg-
ment and, to that extent, mitigate the effect of a contempt 
order. This would place the burden where it should be, that 
is, on the absenting party, and at the same time permit relief 
upon a sufficient showing. 
The action of the lower court in entering a judgment 
and order for Attorney Handy to pay $128.00 was in spirit 
a contempt proceeding and was based upon the attorney's 
misconduct, i. e., failure to appear and failure to inform 
the court of his intended non-appearance. The action of the 
court was in substantial compliance with the requirements 
of Section 78-32-3, supra, and Attorney Handy could have 
gathered no other conclusion from the court's action than 
that the order to pay $128.00 was based upon his conduct 
in failing to attend court. 
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CONCLUSION 
In view of the argument and authority advanced, the 
judgment and order of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
RAYMOND W. GEE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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